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A
prominent view in economics is that malfunction-
ing credit markets “are not simply passive reflections
of a declining real economy, but are in themselves a
major factor depressing economic activity.”1 This view has
greatly influenced monetary policy. A clear example is the
recent “Great Recession,” when financial markets became
volatile and illiquid and the viability of some of the world’s
leading financial institutions was seriously in doubt. Federal
Reserve policymakers responded aggressively by lowering
interest rates to near zero, implementing lending facilities,
and instituting multiple rounds of quantitative easing, parts
of which were aimed directly at supporting the functioning
of the financial system.
Analyses linking the performance of
financial markets to aggregate economic
activity typically have a financial accel-
erator mechanism at their core. Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke eloquently
summarizes the workings of this mech-
anism in a recent speech.2 Here, I inter-
pret movements in business credit
demand and liquid asset holdings in
terms of this theory. 
The key links between the workings
of the financial system and real eco-
nomic activity are easily understood.
Entrepreneurs may develop profitable
projects and firms may find it profitable
to expand or invest more. Both actions
typically require tapping credit markets
to obtain required resources. Access to
credit, however, is limited by the pres-
ence of asymmetric information and
principal-agent problems, which are
natural in credit relations. Financial
institutions appropriately monitor bor-
rowers to help overcome these frictions.
Because of the costs incurred by lenders to monitor
borrowers, external financing is generally costlier than
internal financing. This external finance premium is nega-
tively related to the borrower’s net worth and overall finan-
cial position. This relationship creates a mechanism of
financial acceleration. Any shock that affects the financial
position of the firm affects its borrowing capacity, which
in turn affects its profitability and, ultimately, its financial
position. Shocks that otherwise would be short-lived may
be easily amplified through this channel.
Two natural implications of the accelerator mechanism
are that (i) crises with high financial distress should be
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NOTE: NBER, National Bureau of Economic Research.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States 
(www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/).associated with relatively larger declines in credit and (ii) a
decline in credit should be associated with a decline in
holdings of liquid assets. The chart shows the ratio of net
changes in credit market instruments (including bank loans,
commercial paper, and corporate bonds) to income before
taxes for the U.S. nonfinancial business sector. Credit
declined quite substantially during the Great Recession, as
the theory predicts, given the distressed financial markets.
However, the net change in credit does not seem particu-
larly different from the two previous recessions, which were
milder and not obviously driven by financial distress. Of
note, not only did credit decline from 2008 to 2009, but firms
also started repaying their debts (the change is negative).
Furthermore, they did so while simultaneously accumulat-
ing highly liquid assets (currency, savings, and checkable
deposits). The combination of these two observations is
puzzling if firms are purportedly starving for credit but
cannot obtain it.
The implementation of aggressive policies supporting
credit markets is one possible explanation why credit did
not drop more than in previous crises. It is also possible
that shocks affect small and large firms asymmetrically
and that aggregate data, as used here, mask such effects.
Finally, the recent crisis may have affected very short-term
credit instruments that are not necessarily captured in the
quarterly frequency data available from the Fed’s Flow of
Funds Accounts statistical release. ■
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Firms started repaying their debts 
during 2008-2009, and they did so
while simultaneously accumulating
highly liquid assets. These two 
observations are puzzling if one
believes firms are purportedly 
starving for credit but cannot obtain it.